Background Background Thought insertion is
Thought insertion is commonly regarded as diagnostic of commonly regarded as diagnostic of schizophrenia.Little is known of its schizophrenia.Little is known of its aetiology or pathophysiology. aetiology or pathophysiology.
Aims Aims To examine the definition and
To examine the definition and application of thought insertion in application of thought insertion in psychiatric and allied literatures. psychiatric and allied literatures.
Method
Method A semi-structured literature A semi-structured literature review and conceptual analysis. review and conceptual analysis.
Results
Results When'narrowly'defined, When'narrowly'defined, thought insertion is reliably identified but thought insertion is reliably identified but not specific to schizophrenia.There is a not specific to schizophrenia.There is a range of related phenomena ('alienated', range of related phenomena ('alienated', 'influenced','made'and 'passivity'thinking), 'influenced','made'and 'passivity'thinking), less consistently defined but also not less consistently defined but also not specific to schizophrenia.Whether specific to schizophrenia.Whether thought insertion is solely an abnormal thought insertion is solely an abnormal belief (or may also be an experience) is belief (or may also be an experience) is open to question.Nevertheless, the open to question.Nevertheless, the symptom has been used to explain symptom has been used to explain schizophrenia, predict dangerousness and schizophrenia, predict dangerousness and advance theories of 'normal'agency.Most advance theories of 'normal'agency.Most applications have been subjectto critique. applications have been subject to critique.
Conclusions Conclusions Despite its widespread
Despite its widespread occurrence and diagnostic application, occurrence and diagnostic application, thought insertion is an ill-understood and thought insertion is an ill-understood and underresearched symptom of psychosis. underresearched symptom of psychosis. Its pathophysiology remains obscure. Its pathophysiology remains obscure.
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Reliable clinical recording of symptomatolReliable clinical recording of symptomatology and valid pathophysiological research ogy and valid pathophysiological research require consistent use of terminology. Over require consistent use of terminology. Over time, thought insertion has developed a retime, thought insertion has developed a reliable definition (see Appendix), in contrast liable definition (see Appendix), in contrast to a comparable first-rank symptom of to a comparable first-rank symptom of schizophrenia, thought broadcast (Pawar schizophrenia, thought broadcast (Pawar et al et al, 2002) . However, less is known about , 2002). However, less is known about the validity of though insertion. It is classithe validity of though insertion. It is classified as a delusion, a false belief that the fied as a delusion, a false belief that the subject receives inserted, alien thoughts; subject receives inserted, alien thoughts; but is thought insertion solely a delusion? but is thought insertion solely a delusion? This review examines the phenomenology This review examines the phenomenology of thought insertion and similar, possibly of thought insertion and similar, possibly related phenomena and then proceeds to related phenomena and then proceeds to examine the utilisation of the concept of examine the utilisation of the concept of thought insertion by authors in a variety thought insertion by authors in a variety of literatures. of literatures.
METHOD METHOD
We performed a computerised search of the We performed a computerised search of the following databases: PsycInfo (1887-following databases: PsycInfo (1887 PsycInfo ( -2002 , Medline (1966 Medline ( -2002 , Biosis 2002), Medline (1966 Medline ( -2002 , Biosis (1985 Biosis ( -2002 , Embase (1980 Embase ( -2002 , Philo-(1985 Philo-( -2002 , Embase (1980 Embase ( -2002 , Philosopher's Index (1940 -2002 . A total of 51 sopher 's Index (1940 's Index ( -2002 . A total of 51 references were obtained using the key references were obtained using the key words THOUGHT INSERTION, 201 for words THOUGHT INSERTION, 201 for FIRST RANK SYMPTOMS OF SCHIZO-FIRST RANK SYMPTOMS OF SCHIZO-PHRENIA and a further three for PHRENIA and a further three for THOUGHT ALIENATION. Papers de-THOUGHT ALIENATION. Papers describing the phenomenology of thought scribing the phenomenology of thought insertion were reviewed and data suppleinsertion were reviewed and data supplemented by a manual search of cited articles mented by a manual search of cited articles and books. and books. In total, the full-text versions
In total, the full-text versions of 36 peer-reviewed papers and 14 books of 36 peer-reviewed papers and 14 books were critiqued for this review. were critiqued for this review.
RESULTS RESULTS
The phenomenology of thought The phenomenology of thought insertion insertion
Cultural beliefs about inserted thoughts Cultural beliefs about inserted thoughts
A belief is not regarded as delusional if it is A belief is not regarded as delusional if it is culturally acceptable; and certain phenomculturally acceptable; and certain phenomena resembling thought insertion have ena resembling thought insertion have gained cultural credence through being gained cultural credence through being incorporated into occult, parapsychological incorporated into occult, parapsychological and religious literatures. Freud (1974) was and religious literatures. Freud (1974) was interested in occult phenomena and interested in occult phenomena and described 'thought transference' similar to described 'thought transference' similar to telepathy. He observed professional telepathy. He observed professional 'fortune-tellers' convincing people that they 'fortune-tellers' convincing people that they had acquired intimate knowledge of their had acquired intimate knowledge of their lives through the transfer of thoughts. lives through the transfer of thoughts. Freud's interpretation was that such inforFreud's interpretation was that such information was conveyed at an unconscious mation was conveyed at an unconscious level. However, 'true' telepathy continues level. However, 'true' telepathy continues to be a subject of popular curiosity and, to be a subject of popular curiosity and, were it ever authenticated, would almost were it ever authenticated, would almost certainly imply thought insertion. Similar certainly imply thought insertion. Similar beliefs are also contained in certain beliefs are also contained in certain religious writings. For instance, in the religious writings. For instance, in the Christian New Testament, Mark 13:11 Christian New Testament, Mark 13:11 describes an inspired external control, describes an inspired external control, affecting thought and speech: affecting thought and speech:
'But when they shalllead you, and deliver you up, 'But when they shalllead you, and deliver you up, take no thought beforehand what ye shall speak, take no thought beforehand what ye shall speak, neither do ye premeditate; but whatsoever shall neither do ye premeditate; but whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye: for it is be given you in that hour, that speak ye: for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Ghost.' not ye that speak, but the Holy Ghost.' (Authorised King James Version) (Authorised King James Version) Some contemporary authors have arSome contemporary authors have argued that first-rank symptoms are nongued that first-rank symptoms are nonpathological in the context of spiritual pathological in the context of spiritual experience. In their first case ('Simon'), experience. In their first case ('Simon'), Jackson & Fulford (1997) describe thought Jackson & Fulford (1997) describe thought insertion but discount its pathological natinsertion but discount its pathological nature because Simon appears otherwise well ure because Simon appears otherwise well and is professionally successful. His experiand is professionally successful. His experiences seem congruent with his religious ences seem congruent with his religious beliefs. Yet, he clearly describes household beliefs. Yet, he clearly describes household appliances affecting his thinking: 'the things appliances affecting his thinking: 'the things that come are not the things that I have that come are not the things that I have been thinking about . . . They kind of short been thinking about . . . They kind of short circuit the brain, and bring their message'. circuit the brain, and bring their message'.
Thought sharing Thought sharing
There are, of course, natural means by There are, of course, natural means by which one person's thoughts can be known which one person's thoughts can be known to another: for example, we can deduce to another: for example, we can deduce what others think from their manifest what others think from their manifest behaviours. However, in pathological states behaviours. However, in pathological states there is a subjective breach of a perceived there is a subjective breach of a perceived psychological border, conceptualised as psychological border, conceptualised as the 'ego-boundary', which is described the 'ego-boundary', which is described 'concretely' (Sims, 1991) . In some way, 'concretely' (Sims, 1991) . In some way, the victim's mind/ego seems (to him or the victim's mind/ego seems (to him or her) to become permeable, and abnormal her) to become permeable, and abnormal influence passes 'into' or 'out from' the influence passes 'into' or 'out from' the 'ego' according to the symptom type. 'ego' according to the symptom type. Hence, Fish (1967) describes the egoHence, Fish (1967) describes the egoboundary losing its normal integrity in boundary losing its normal integrity in schizophrenia: schizophrenia:
'[The] patient knows that his thoughts and '[The] patient knows that his thoughts and actions have an excessive effect on the world actions have an excessive effect on the world around him, and he experiences activity, which around him, and he experiences activity, which 2 9 3 2 9 3 B R I T I S H J O UR N A L O F P SYC HI AT RY B R I T I S H J O UR N A L O F P S YC H I AT RY ( 2 0 0 3 ) , 1 8 2 , 2 9 3^2 9 8 ( 2 0 0 3 ) , 1 8 2 , 2 9 3^2 9 8 Although most authors emphasise those Although most authors emphasise those symptoms in which influence encroaches symptoms in which influence encroaches upon the ego (Appendix), Stanghellini & upon the ego (Appendix), Stanghellini & Monti (1993) delineate an experience of acMonti (1993) delineate an experience of activity. Patients could believe that they can tivity. Patients could believe that they can breach the ego-boundaries of others: for exbreach the ego-boundaries of others: for example, one stated that her thoughts could ample, one stated that her thoughts could 'fly' to others, who could 'catch' them. 'fly' to others, who could 'catch' them. Without this sense of activity or volition Without this sense of activity or volition such an experience might resemble thought such an experience might resemble thought broadcast (Pawar broadcast (Pawar et al et al, 2002) . , 2002). Hence, the ego-boundary can be Hence, the ego-boundary can be permeable in both 'directions' ('inwards' permeable in both 'directions' ('inwards' and 'outwards') and specific first-rank and 'outwards') and specific first-rank symptoms could preferentially implicate symptoms could preferentially implicate such directional permeability. In thought such directional permeability. In thought insertion the permeation is inwards: insertion the permeation is inwards: another's thoughts breach the ego-boundanother's thoughts breach the ego-boundary. In thought withdrawal and broadcast ary. In thought withdrawal and broadcast the permeation is outwards: the patients' the permeation is outwards: the patients' own thoughts pass externally (Table 1) . own thoughts pass externally (Table 1) .
Thought insertion Thought insertion
The experience of thought insertion has The experience of thought insertion has two components: two components: Earlier descriptions of thought insertion Earlier descriptions of thought insertion are found in Jaspers (1963) . In one case a are found in Jaspers (1963) . In one case a patient describes such thoughts as patient describes such thoughts as 'com[ing] at any moment like a gift . . . I 'com[ing] at any moment like a gift . . . I do not dare to impart them as if they were do not dare to impart them as if they were my own' (Gruhle, in Jaspers, 1963) . Jaspers my own' (Gruhle, in Jaspers, 1963) . Jaspers refers to these thoughts as 'implanted, comrefers to these thoughts as 'implanted, coming like an inspiration from elsewhere' and ing like an inspiration from elsewhere' and remarks that 'no one speaks them to the remarks that 'no one speaks them to the patient nor are the thoughts ''made'', . . . patient nor are the thoughts ''made'', . . . the thoughts are the thoughts are not not his own' (italics his own' (italics added). added).
Jaspers seems to distinguish such surJaspers seems to distinguish such surprising or incongruous 'inserted/implanted' prising or incongruous 'inserted/implanted' thoughts from those that are 'made by thoughts from those that are 'made by others', by which he seems to mean others', by which he seems to mean thoughts that emerge under the perceived thoughts that emerge under the perceived influence of an external agent (so-called influence of an external agent (so-called 'passivity thinking'; Appendix). 'passivity thinking'; Appendix).
'Patients think something and yet feel that some-'Patients think something and yet feel that someone else has thought it and in some way forced it one else has thought it and in some way forced it on them. The thought arises and with it a direct on them. The thought arises and with it a direct awareness that it is not the patient but some awareness that it is not the patient but some external agent that thinks it. The patient does external agent that thinks it. The patient does not know why he has this thought nor did he not know why he has this thought nor did he intend to have it. He does not feel master of his intend to have it. He does not feel master of his own thoughts and in addition he feels in the own thoughts and in addition he feels in the power of some incomprehensible external force' power of some incomprehensible external force' (pp.122^123). (pp.122^123).
Hence, the patient with passivity thinkHence, the patient with passivity thinking reports: 'Some artificial ing reports: 'Some artificial influence influence plays plays on me; the feeling suggests that somebody on me; the feeling suggests that somebody has attached himself to my mind and has attached himself to my mind and feeling . . . ' (Jaspers, 1963: p. 123 ; italics feeling . . . ' (Jaspers, 1963: p. 123 ; italics added). added).
Jaspers' distinction between 'implanted Jaspers' distinction between 'implanted thoughts' and 'passivity thinking' is, therethoughts' and 'passivity thinking' is, therefore, a subtle one. It seems to hinge upon fore, a subtle one. It seems to hinge upon whether the thought came spontaneously whether the thought came spontaneously (i.e. was 'implanted') or emerged under (i.e. was 'implanted') or emerged under the perceived influence of another ('made', the perceived influence of another ('made', 'passivity' thinking). In modern parlance, 'passivity' thinking). In modern parlance, the former has been described as a narrowly the former has been described as a narrowly defined thought insertion, whereas the defined thought insertion, whereas the latter, influenced (or 'controlled') thinking, latter, influenced (or 'controlled') thinking, has been seen as comprising a broader catehas been seen as comprising a broader category, with possible diagnostic implications gory, with possible diagnostic implications (O'Grady, 1990; cf. Peralta & Cuesta, (O'Grady, 1990; cf. Peralta & Cuesta, 1999) . 1999).
Taylor & Heiser (1971) also draw a Taylor & Heiser (1971) also draw a distinction between the ownership of a distinction between the ownership of a thought and the process of thinking it. thought and the process of thinking it. These authors (and Koehler, 1979) distinThese authors (and Koehler, 1979) distinguish the 'experience of influence' (in which guish the 'experience of influence' (in which the the process process of thinking is controlled from of thinking is controlled from outside) from the 'experience of alienation' outside) from the 'experience of alienation' (in which a thought belongs to another (in which a thought belongs to another agency; i.e. is inserted). Hence, the agency; i.e. is inserted). Hence, the influence/alienation distinction equates to influence/alienation distinction equates to that of passivity/implantation. In each that of passivity/implantation. In each dichotomy it is the second term that satisdichotomy it is the second term that satisfies the contemporary definition of thought fies the contemporary definition of thought insertion (Appendix). Koehler is explicit insertion (Appendix). Koehler is explicit that although the 'influenced' patient owns that although the 'influenced' patient owns his or her thoughts, the thought insertion his or her thoughts, the thought insertion patient does not. patient does not.
Other terms Other terms
As Jaspers' subtlety illustrates, there is a poAs Jaspers' subtlety illustrates, there is a potential for confusion at the boundaries of tential for confusion at the boundaries of the thought insertion concept, and multiple the thought insertion concept, and multiple terms have been used in describing similar terms have been used in describing similar (non-thought insertion) phenomena: 'influ-(non-thought insertion) phenomena: 'influenced', 'made' and 'passivity' thinking enced', 'made' and 'passivity' thinking (Appendix). Although these three terms (Appendix). Although these three terms appear equivalent, problems arise when appear equivalent, problems arise when others are applied inconsistently. Fish differentiates this form of 'alienaFish differentiates this form of 'alienation' from thought insertion, which he tion' from thought insertion, which he describes thus: describes thus:
'[The patient] knows that thoughts are being '[The patient] knows that thoughts are being inserted into his mind, and recognises them as inserted into his mind, and recognises them as being foreign and coming from without' (Fish, being foreign and coming from without' (Fish, 1967 (Fish, : p. 39). 1967 ).
Hence, the term 'thought alienation' is Hence, the term 'thought alienation' is probably best avoided, as it means different probably best avoided, as it means different things to different authors. things to different authors.
Elsewhere, Schneider (1959) uses Elsewhere, Schneider (1959) uses another term, 'thought intrusion', when another term, 'thought intrusion', when describing external influence, attributed to describing external influence, attributed to hypnosis by a woman with schizophrenia. hypnosis by a woman with schizophrenia. Although his precise meaning is uncertain, Although his precise meaning is uncertain, 'intrusion' (in this context) appears 'intrusion' (in this context) appears equivalent to influence. equivalent to influence.
The act of thinking: 'agency' The act of thinking: 'agency'
The perceived process of thinking seems to The perceived process of thinking seems to be important when making some of the be important when making some of the above distinctions (e.g. between 'influabove distinctions (e.g. between 'influenced' and 'inserted' thoughts). During 'inenced' and 'inserted' thoughts). During 'influence' the process of thinking has been fluence' the process of thinking has been noticeably altered, whereas during 'insernoticeably altered, whereas during 'insertion' it is reportedly absent; the thought tion' it is reportedly absent; the thought 'arrives' 'arrives' de novo de novo. Indeed, Mellor (1970) . Indeed, Mellor (1970) states that inserted thoughts are forced states that inserted thoughts are forced upon 'passive' minds and Jaspers (1963) upon 'passive' minds and Jaspers (1963) Koehler (1979) : in thought withdrawal,'the subject is quite certain of ''negatively'' being aware that he has lost HIS 2. In Koehler (1979) : in thought withdrawal,'the subject is quite certain of ''negatively'' being aware that he has lost HIS OWN thoughts . . . because they have been actively taken away from without' (original capitals). OWN thoughts . . . because they have been actively taken away from without' (original capitals).
comments that 'the patient does not oppose comments that 'the patient does not oppose them in any way'. The common feature that them in any way'. The common feature that has been stressed is a loss of volition. In this has been stressed is a loss of volition. In this state (thought insertion), the subject is the state (thought insertion), the subject is the passive recipient of alien thoughts that are passive recipient of alien thoughts that are the products of alien thinking. the products of alien thinking. The philosophers Stephens & Graham The philosophers Stephens & Graham (1994) , conceptualise thought insertion as (1994), conceptualise thought insertion as a problem of 'agency', which they define a problem of 'agency', which they define as 'consist [ing] in regarding one's mental as 'consist [ing] in regarding one's mental episodes or thoughts as expressions of one's episodes or thoughts as expressions of one's own active doing: as things one does rather own active doing: as things one does rather than things that happen to one'. Hence, than things that happen to one'. Hence, they differentiate 'influenced' thinking from they differentiate 'influenced' thinking from thought insertion on the basis of whether or thought insertion on the basis of whether or not the alien performs the thinking. 'The not the alien performs the thinking. 'The merely influenced subject believes that merely influenced subject believes that someone else has caused someone else has caused him him to think the to think the thought. . . In thought insertion, by conthought. . . In thought insertion, by contrast, the subject believes that trast, the subject believes that someone else someone else has actually done the thinking for him has actually done the thinking for him. He . He has not been manipulated into thinking has not been manipulated into thinking something; rather his something; rather his agency agency has been has been bypassed completely' (italics added). bypassed completely' (italics added).
Hence, the concept of agency helps us Hence, the concept of agency helps us to disambiguate thought insertion from into disambiguate thought insertion from influenced/made thinking (Table 1 ). An 'influenced/made thinking (Table 1 ). An 'influenced' thought emerges when the alien fluenced' thought emerges when the alien 'other' interferes with the subject's agency 'other' interferes with the subject's agency but the subject owns the ensuing thought. but the subject owns the ensuing thought. In thought insertion the subject's own In thought insertion the subject's own agency is absent and an alien thought is agency is absent and an alien thought is 'inserted'. In this account, patients retain 'inserted'. In this account, patients retain ownership of a 'made' thought whereas ownership of a 'made' thought whereas thought insertion thoughts (by definition) thought insertion thoughts (by definition) are experienced as 'alien'. are experienced as 'alien'.
Again, these distinctions are rather Again, these distinctions are rather subtle, and may be difficult to fully elucisubtle, and may be difficult to fully elucidate clinically. Stephens & Graham's defidate clinically. Stephens & Graham's definition of 'influenced' thinking may go nition of 'influenced' thinking may go further than that of Jaspers (1963) . The latfurther than that of Jaspers (1963). The latter's account does not state explicitly that ter's account does not state explicitly that influenced thinking permits (self-) ownerinfluenced thinking permits (self-) ownership of the ensuing thought. However, ship of the ensuing thought. However, some of our own patients have made such some of our own patients have made such a distinction: a distinction:
' A man said that 'great forces' were being used ' A man said that 'great forces' were being used against his thinking, but that his thoughts were against his thinking, but that his thoughts were still his own' (Spence still his own' (Spence et al et al,1997) . ,1997).
Thought insertion and attribution Thought insertion and attribution
Some subjects attribute their loss of agency Some subjects attribute their loss of agency to an identified other (e.g. Eamonn to an identified other (e.g. Eamonn Andrews, above) but this is not universal. Andrews, above) but this is not universal. Similarly, patients describe various Similarly, patients describe various modes of causation. 'Influencing machines' modes of causation. 'Influencing machines' were described before the first-rank sympwere described before the first-rank symptoms were first 'ranked' by Schneider. toms were first 'ranked' by Schneider. 'Air-loom machines', reported by James 'Air-loom machines', reported by James Tilly Matthews (1800), were said by him Tilly Matthews (1800), were said by him to have the power 'to to have the power 'to make ideas make ideas or to steal or to steal others . . . ' (Haslam, 1810 , in Porter, 1991 : others . . .' (Haslam, 1810 , in Porter, 1991 ; italics added). Tausk's (1988) p. 146; italics added). Tausk's (1988) patient with schizophrenia described her patient with schizophrenia described her thoughts as being produced by an 'electrical thoughts as being produced by an 'electrical machine' controlled by others, at a dismachine' controlled by others, at a distance. A patient of Jaspers (1963) also tance. A patient of Jaspers (1963) also described the experience of electricity: described the experience of electricity: 'one evening the thought 'one evening the thought was given to me was given to me electrically that I should murder Lissi' electrically that I should murder Lissi' (original italics). Again, some of our own (original italics). Again, some of our own patients bear out this experiential quality, patients bear out this experiential quality, prompting explanations of aetiology: prompting explanations of aetiology:
'One man said that thoughts were being put into 'One man said that thoughts were being put into his mind and that they ''felt different'' from his his mind and that they ''felt different'' from his own; another said that the television and radio own; another said that the television and radio were responsible for different thoughts, which were responsible for different thoughts, which were''tampered with electrically''and always felt were''tampered with electrically''and always felt the same way (i.e. recognisably different from the same way (i.e. recognisably different from his''own'')' (Spence his''own'')' (Spence et al et al,1997) . ,1997).
Diverse mechanisms are reported, inDiverse mechanisms are reported, including hypnotism in Schneider's case cluding hypnotism in Schneider's case (above) and that of Reiter (1926): while (above) and that of Reiter (1926) : while experiencing schizophrenia, a woman experiencing schizophrenia, a woman believed that 'she was hypnotised by believed that 'she was hypnotised by Professor C., who transferred his thoughts Professor C., who transferred his thoughts to her and made her do as he wanted'. to her and made her do as he wanted'.
Beliefs regarding the mechanism Beliefs regarding the mechanism through which another usurps agency have through which another usurps agency have assumed little importance in modern diagassumed little importance in modern diagnostic criteria. The significance of such nostic criteria. The significance of such additional psychopathology has not been additional psychopathology has not been elaborated. Does it matter whether a elaborated. Does it matter whether a machine, a spirit or an agent unknown to machine, a spirit or an agent unknown to the subject inserts a thought? According the subject inserts a thought? According to Berrios (1997) , such content is of little to Berrios (1997), such content is of little explanatory interest; delusions are 'empty explanatory interest; delusions are 'empty speech acts'. However, it is conceivable that speech acts'. However, it is conceivable that beliefs and attributions could help deterbeliefs and attributions could help determine whether the subject seeks, or is mine whether the subject seeks, or is brought to, psychiatric attention. If subjects brought to, psychiatric attention. If subjects experience a spiritual dimension to thought experience a spiritual dimension to thought insertion, and are not behaviourally cominsertion, and are not behaviourally compromised, then they might seek religious promised, then they might seek religious or spiritual contexts (Jackson & Fulford, or spiritual contexts (Jackson & Fulford, 1997) . 1997).
Is thought insertion solely a belief? Is thought insertion solely a belief?
Subjects experiencing thought insertion Subjects experiencing thought insertion were included in Nayani & David's were included in Nayani & David's (1996) phenomenological survey of audi-(1996) phenomenological survey of auditory hallucinations. These subjects' descriptory hallucinations. These subjects' descriptions of their 'alien' thoughts varied quite tions of their 'alien' thoughts varied quite widely: 'internal hallucinators' (i.e. those widely: 'internal hallucinators' (i.e. those who heard voices 'inside their heads') deswho heard voices 'inside their heads') described inserted thoughts in terms of bad imcribed inserted thoughts in terms of bad impulses or unpleasant visual images (e.g. to pulses or unpleasant visual images (e.g. to maim or kill) whereas 'external hallucinamaim or kill) whereas 'external hallucinators' described them in terms of unpleasant tors' described them in terms of unpleasant internal voices. Other authors have desinternal voices. Other authors have described patients whose inserted thoughts cribed patients whose inserted thoughts 'feel different' (e.g. Spence 'feel different' (e.g. Spence et al et al, 1997) , , 1997), and in Cahill & Frith (1996) , a patient and in Cahill & Frith (1996) , a patient identified the exact point of entry of an identified the exact point of entry of an inserted thought into his head. As well as inserted thought into his head. As well as being alien, the thought could be 'felt' to being alien, the thought could be 'felt' to enter. Hence thought insertion might not enter. Hence thought insertion might not be solely a belief: in some (if not all) be solely a belief: in some (if not all) patients it can incorporate abnormalities patients it can incorporate abnormalities of perception. This is also implied by those of perception. This is also implied by those authors who distinguish 'experiences of authors who distinguish 'experiences of alienation' from 'experiences of influence' alienation' from 'experiences of influence ' (Taylor & Heiser, 1971; Koehler, 1979) . (Taylor & Heiser, 1971; Koehler, 1979) .
The applications of thought The applications of thought insertion insertion

Diagnosis Diagnosis
The centrality of first-rank symptoms to the The centrality of first-rank symptoms to the diagnosis of schizophrenia, although condiagnosis of schizophrenia, although controversial (Crichton, 1996) , is apparent in troversial (Crichton, 1996) , is apparent in the standard diagnostic manuals (e.g. the standard diagnostic manuals (e.g. ICD-10). Thought insertion, on its own, ICD-10). Thought insertion, on its own, is sufficient for a diagnosis of schizophrenia is sufficient for a diagnosis of schizophrenia to be made, if present for 1 month in the to be made, if present for 1 month in the absence of an organic or mood disorder absence of an organic or mood disorder (F20, ICD-10; World Health Organization, (F20, ICD-10; World Health Organization, 1992). Hence, a simple definition of 1992). Hence, a simple definition of thought insertion can appear to simplify thought insertion can appear to simplify practice for clinicians attempting to diagpractice for clinicians attempting to diagnose a complex disorder in the absence of nose a complex disorder in the absence of a biologically validated pathognomonic a biologically validated pathognomonic marker. Also, first-rank symptoms can be marker. Also, first-rank symptoms can be reliably agreed upon by different examiners reliably agreed upon by different examiners (e.g. McGuffin (e.g. McGuffin et al et al, 1984) . , 1984). Consistent with this view, O'Grady Consistent with this view, O'Grady (1990) reported that 'narrow' definitions (1990) reported that 'narrow' definitions of first-rank symptoms (as a group) might of first-rank symptoms (as a group) might be more specific to schizophrenia (cf. psybe more specific to schizophrenia (cf. psychotic depression). Hence, thought inserchotic depression). Hence, thought insertion might be more 'schizophrenic' than is tion might be more 'schizophrenic' than is 'influenced' thinking. However, relatively 'influenced' thinking. However, relatively few patients in his sample exhibited firstfew patients in his sample exhibited firstrank symptoms and these symptoms were rank symptoms and these symptoms were not investigated individually. not investigated individually.
A later and larger study of people A later and larger study of people with psychoses (Peralta & Cuesta, 1999) with psychoses (Peralta & Cuesta, 1999) found thought insertion and other firstfound thought insertion and other firstrank symptoms to be distributed across rank symptoms to be distributed across psychotic diagnoses and not specific to psychotic diagnoses and not specific to schizophrenia; schizophrenia; the study utilised phenomthe study utilised phenomenological definitions comparable with enological definitions comparable with those of Mellor, 1970) . Thought insertion those of Mellor, 1970) . Thought insertion was elicited in 19% of people diagnosed was elicited in 19% of people diagnosed with schizophrenia (19.7% in Mellor's with schizophrenia (19.7% in Mellor's study), 7.2% of those with 'mood disorder' study), 7.2% of those with 'mood disorder' and similar percentages of those with 'brief and similar percentages of those with 'brief reactive' reactive' (8%) and 'atypical' psychoses (8%) and 'atypical' psychoses (6%). The figures for 'made thoughts' (6%). The figures for 'made thoughts' were 35.8, were 35.8, 27.7, 32 and 18%, respec-27.7, 32 and 18%, respectively (Peralta tively (Peralta & Cuesta, 1999) . The & Cuesta, 1999) . The authors concluded that first-rank symptoms authors concluded that first-rank symptoms are symptomatic of psychosis generally, are symptomatic of psychosis generally, and not schizophrenia specifically. and not schizophrenia specifically.
Explaining schizophrenia Explaining schizophrenia
Notwithstanding the above findings, Notwithstanding the above findings, although schizophrenia has lacked a although schizophrenia has lacked a pathognomonic biological marker, its charpathognomonic biological marker, its characteristic symptoms (such as thought acteristic symptoms (such as thought insertion) have been used by some to insertion) have been used by some to explain the syndrome. explain the syndrome. Hence, Nasrallah
Hence, Nasrallah (1985) proposed that thought insertion (1985) proposed that thought insertion is an indicator of defective interis an indicator of defective interhemispheric integration, thoughts from the hemispheric integration, thoughts from the right hemisphere being interpreted as 'alien' right hemisphere being interpreted as 'alien' by the left. Crow (1998) has likewise by the left. Crow (1998) has likewise focused upon first-rank symptoms, in focused upon first-rank symptoms, in advancing the theory that schizophrenia is advancing the theory that schizophrenia is the 'price humans pay for language'. Again, the 'price humans pay for language'. Again, deficits in hemispheric integration/asymdeficits in hemispheric integration/asymmetry are invoked to explain first-rank metry are invoked to explain first-rank symptoms. Also, Frith's (1992) cognitive symptoms. Also, Frith's (1992) cognitive neuropsychological account of thought neuropsychological account of thought insertion and other first-rank symptoms insertion and other first-rank symptoms has been generalised into a model of has been generalised into a model of disordered 'internal monitoring'. Hence, disordered 'internal monitoring'. Hence, inserted thoughts are inserted thoughts are experienced as such experienced as such because the subject/patient is unaware of because the subject/patient is unaware of his or her own intentions (to think). his or her own intentions (to think). Thoughts arising unbidden are therefore Thoughts arising unbidden are therefore perceived as 'alien'. Critique of this eleperceived as 'alien'. Critique of this elegant and influential theory is beyond the gant and influential theory is beyond the scope of this paper but rehearsed extenscope of this paper but rehearsed extensively elsewhere (Campbell, 1999; Spence, sively elsewhere (Campbell, 1999; Spence, 2001; Thornton, 2002 Thornton, ). 2001 Thornton, 2002) .
Forensic psychiatry Forensic psychiatry
A diagnostic symptom detectable on a sin-A diagnostic symptom detectable on a single mental state examination might be pargle mental state examination might be particularly useful for forensic psychiatrists ticularly useful for forensic psychiatrists having to perform assessments under diffihaving to perform assessments under difficult conditions. Thought insertion appears cult conditions. Thought insertion appears useful because of its perceived diagnostic useful because of its perceived diagnostic significance and because it is relatively relisignificance and because it is relatively reliable. Furthermore, there have been reports able. Furthermore, there have been reports of its possible utility in predicting dangerof its possible utility in predicting dangerousness. Link ousness. Link et al et al (1992) described the (1992) described the 'threat/control-override' syndrome after 'threat/control-override' syndrome after epidemiological studies (initially replicated) epidemiological studies (initially replicated) suggested that the difference in 'previous suggested that the difference in 'previous violence' between former patients and conviolence' between former patients and controls could be accounted for by the presence trols could be accounted for by the presence of specific symptoms, including persecutory of specific symptoms, including persecutory delusions and thought insertion. Such padelusions and thought insertion. Such patients reported beliefs that involved either tients reported beliefs that involved either a perceived threat to themselves or external a perceived threat to themselves or external control over their minds and actions. The control over their minds and actions. The strength of the association with violence strength of the association with violence increased with the number of delusions preincreased with the number of delusions present (Link sent (Link et al et al, 1992) . However, subse-, 1992). However, subsequent prospective studies have failed to quent prospective studies have failed to replicate this finding, and it seems as if a replicate this finding, and it seems as if a number of confounding variables could number of confounding variables could account for the original results: a retrospecaccount for the original results: a retrospective design; reliance upon self-report of tive design; reliance upon self-report of symptoms; and failure to control for anger symptoms; and failure to control for anger and impulsivity (Appelbaum and impulsivity (Appelbaum et al et al, 2000) . , 2000).
Philosophy of mind Philosophy of mind
Understanding the nature of unusual Understanding the nature of unusual human experience has long been common human experience has long been common ground for psychiatry and philosophy. Reground for psychiatry and philosophy. Recent interdisciplinary dialogue has been cent interdisciplinary dialogue has been realised (to a degree) through the mutual realised (to a degree) through the mutual investigation of thought insertion (e.g. investigation of thought insertion (e.g. Chadwick, 1994; Fulford, 1995; Spence, Chadwick, 1994; Fulford, 1995; Spence, 1996 Spence, , 2001 Gibbs, 2000; Stephens, 2000; 1996 , 2001 Gibbs, 2000; Stephens, 2000; Thornton, 2002) . The subjective experience Thornton, 2002) . The subjective experience of thought insertion appears to challenge a of thought insertion appears to challenge a key philosophical concept: 'immunity to key philosophical concept: 'immunity to subjective error'. If a subject is aware of a subjective error'. If a subject is aware of a thought, how can she claim that the thought, how can she claim that the thought is not hers? Assuming intelligibilthought is not hers? Assuming intelligibility, some philosophers have begun to tackle ity, some philosophers have begun to tackle thought insertion. Hence, to Stephens & thought insertion. Hence, to Stephens & Graham (1994) a solution is the distinction Graham (1994) a solution is the distinction between subjectivity and agency: although between subjectivity and agency: although the subject retains awareness of her the subject retains awareness of her thoughts (subjectivity), she has lost the thoughts (subjectivity), she has lost the associated sense of mental causation associated sense of mental causation (agency). It is noticeable how similar these (agency). It is noticeable how similar these formulations are to psychological models formulations are to psychological models of 'unawareness' of voluntary processes of 'unawareness' of voluntary processes (Angyal, 1936; Feinberg, 1978; Frith, (Angyal, 1936; Feinberg, 1978; Frith, 1992) . However, what remains unex-1992) . However, what remains unexplained is the distinction between 'inserted' plained is the distinction between 'inserted' thoughts and those everyday thoughts that thoughts and those everyday thoughts that come into our minds, apparently spontacome into our minds, apparently spontaneously, and to which we do not attach neously, and to which we do not attach any paranoid interpretation (Spence, 1996) . any paranoid interpretation (Spence, 1996) . Invoking a 'normal' model of thinking, in Invoking a 'normal' model of thinking, in which thoughts are preceded by 'intentions' which thoughts are preceded by 'intentions' to think (Frith, 1992) , is open to critique to think (Frith, 1992) , is open to critique (see Campbell, 1999; Spence, 2001; Thorn-(see Campbell, 1999; Spence, 2001; Thornton, ton, 2002) . Among other problems, it opens 2002). Among other problems, it opens up an infinite regress: intentions to think up an infinite regress: intentions to think would themselves be preceded by intentions would themselves be preceded by intentions to think, to think, ad infinitum ad infinitum. .
Gaps in the literature Gaps in the literature
Our review has revealed no pathophysioOur review has revealed no pathophysiological studies of thought insertion logical studies of thought insertion per se per se and few that have reported findings of more and few that have reported findings of more than tangential relevance. One case report than tangential relevance. One case report suggests that symptoms resembling influsuggests that symptoms resembling influenced thinking can follow posterior right enced thinking can follow posterior right hemisphere lesions (Mesulam, 1981) . A hemisphere lesions (Mesulam, 1981) . A study comparing first-rank symptoms in study comparing first-rank symptoms in people with idiopathic schizophrenia with people with idiopathic schizophrenia with those occurring secondary to temporal lobe those occurring secondary to temporal lobe epilepsy found no difference in the rates of epilepsy found no difference in the rates of thought insertion (implying that temporal thought insertion (implying that temporal lobe dysfunction might be equally relevant lobe dysfunction might be equally relevant to both; Oyebode & Davison, 1989) . A to both; Oyebode & Davison, 1989) . A neuroimaging study of 'made movements' neuroimaging study of 'made movements' implicated the right parietal cortex but implicated the right parietal cortex but these data were not examined for associathese data were not examined for associations with thought insertion, or influenced tions with thought insertion, or influenced thinking, where present (Spence thinking, where present (Spence et al et al, , 1997 ). It appears that the pathophysiology 1997). It appears that the pathophysiology of thought insertion awaits elucidation. of thought insertion awaits elucidation. However, there is some evidence that However, there is some evidence that first-rank symptoms (including thought infirst-rank symptoms (including thought insertion) could be partially heritable (Loftus sertion) could be partially heritable (Loftus et al et al, 2000; Cardno , 2000; Cardno et al et al, 2002) . , 2002). Other noticeable absences from our Other noticeable absences from our review include systematic studies of the review include systematic studies of the phenomenology of thought insertion and phenomenology of thought insertion and any coping mechanisms adopted by those any coping mechanisms adopted by those affected. One anecdotal report describes a affected. One anecdotal report describes a patient who screamed to stop thoughts patient who screamed to stop thoughts entering his mind (Spence, 1999) . entering his mind (Spence, 1999) .
These gaps in the literature could reflect These gaps in the literature could reflect the inherent difficulty of 'capturing' such the inherent difficulty of 'capturing' such phenomena and also an assumption that phenomena and also an assumption that thought insertion is solely an abnormal thought insertion is solely an abnormal belief. Our review suggests that thought belief. Our review suggests that thought insertion is still little understood. Further insertion is still little understood. Further research could assist in understanding both research could assist in understanding both its emergence in the psychotic process and its emergence in the psychotic process and those related phenomena thought to affect those related phenomena thought to affect the 'healthy' mind (Jackson & Fulford, the 'healthy' mind (Jackson & Fulford, 1997) . 1997).
APPENDIX APPENDIX
Definitions of thought insertion Definitions of thought insertion and related phenomena and related phenomena
Thought insertion Thought insertion
'The subject believes that thoughts that are not his 'The subject believes that thoughts that are not his own have been inserted into his mind.' (Andreasen, own have been inserted into his mind. ' (Andreasen, 1984) 1984)
The subject ' experiences thoughts which are not his The subject 'experiences thoughts which are not his own intruding into his mind. The symptom is not that own intruding into his mind. The symptom is not that he has been caused to have unusual thoughts, but he has been caused to have unusual thoughts, but that the thoughts themselves are not his' (Wing that the thoughts themselves are not his' (Wing et et al al, 1983) , 1983). . Same meaning applied by Fish (1967 ), Mellor (1970 Same meaning applied by Fish (1967 ), Mellor (1970 and Landmark (1982). and Landmark (1982) .
Equivalent terms
Equivalent terms: 'implanted thoughts' ( Jaspers, : 'implanted thoughts' (Jaspers, 1963); ' experience of alienation ' ( Taylor & Heiser, 1963) ; 'experience of alienation ' (Taylor & Heiser, 1971) ; 'passive experience of alienation ' (Koehler, 1971) ; 'passive experience of alienation ' (Koehler, 1979) . 1979).
Influenced thinking Influenced thinking
The patient's 'OWN thoughts . . . are being conThe patient's 'OWN thoughts . . . are being controlled or influenced by an outside force' (Koehler, trolled or influenced by an outside force' (Koehler, 1979 ; original capitals). 1979; original capitals).
Same meaning applied by Landmark (1982) and Same meaning applied by Landmark (1982) and O'Grady (1990) . O'Grady (1990) .
Equivalent terms
Equivalent terms: 'made' and 'passivity' thinking : 'made' and 'passivity' thinking ( Jaspers, 1963); 'thought alienation' (Fish, 1967) ; ( Jaspers, 1963) ; 'thought alienation' (Fish, 1967) ; 'experience of influence ' ( Taylor & Heiser, 1971) ; 'experience of influence ' (Taylor & Heiser, 1971) ; possibly 'thought intrusion' (Schneider, 1959) . possibly 'thought intrusion' (Schneider, 1959) . Stephens, G. L. (2000) Stephens, G. L. (2000 
Experiences of activity
